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Abstract
In this paper, the problem of physical layer security enhancement in a millimeter-wave (mmWave) network
equipped with multiple Intelligent Reflecting Surfaces (IRSs) is investigated. In this network, the IRSs assist in
signal transmission from the Base Station (BS) to desired users and at the same time in securing signals from
an unauthorized eavesdropper. Our objective is to maximize the secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the active and
passive beamformers at the base station and IRSs, respectively. The optimization problem is non-convex and hence,
we solve it by decomposing it into two disjoint active and passive beamforming design sub-problems and then
iteratively solving them by alternating and Semi-Definite Relaxation (SDR) techniques. Simulation results show
the advantage of using multiple IRSs in secrecy rate enhancement of the mmWave networks. In addition, we show
how the secrecy rate improves with the number of IRSs in the network and also with the number of reflecting
elements at the IRS.
Index Terms
Intelligent Reflecting Surface (IRS), multi-IRS assisted networks, mmWave communications, physical layer
security, secrecy rate enhancement, convex optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key promising technologies proposed for the next generation of wireless networks is
millimeter Wave (mmWave) communications [1], [2]. The main advantages of the mmWave bands are
higher bandwidth, higher frequency reuse, less interference, and smaller antenna array dimensions [2].
2Despite these benefits, mmWave communications are more sensitive to blockage by obstacles and suffer
from a large attenuation compared with lower frequencies [2]. On the other hand, Intelligent Reflecting
Surface (IRS) is another technology that has been recently proposed for improving the performance of
wireless communication networks [3]. These are metasurfaces that can control the angle of the wireless
signals to focus them on a point of interest. This can improve the wireless links qualities and different
performance metrics such as spectral efficiency, energy efficiency, and also physical layer security. The
IRSs can also been employed in the mmWave networks to improve link quality and to compensate for
the blockage effect and high path loss in these networks.
For example, passive beamforming design in mmWave environment is studied in [3]. In [4] a trade-off
between the number of reflecting elements at the IRS and the BS’s transmission power is investigated.
Also, it is shown that when the number of reflecting elements at the IRS increases, the BS’s power can
be decreased quadratically. Wang et al. in [5], propose an algorithm to maximize users received power by
joint active and passive beamforming in multi-IRSs assisted communications. Also in [6], a joint power
allocation and beamforming design for maximizing the weighted sum rate in the mmWave systems where
multi-IRSs are employed is proposed.
The problem of physical layer security by using IRS has also been studied in the recent literature. For
example, joint optimizing of the BS beamforming and IRS phase shifts for secrecy rate maximization is
considered in [7]–[9]. Furthermore, using Artificial Noise (AN) to enhance the secrecy rate of an IRS-
assisted system is studied in [10]. By employing a physical layer security approach, the authors in [11]
have jointly designed beamformers and AN covariance matrix at the BS, and phase shifts of the IRSs
to improve the sum-rate of a multi-IRS system. However, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of
secrecy rate maximization in multi-IRS networks operating in the mmWave frequency bands has not been
studied in the literature.
In this paper, we study the problem of physical layer security in a multi-IRS assisted millimeter-wave
network. In this network, the IRSs are utilized to create multiple transmission links between a multi-
antenna BS and a single antenna user in the presence of a single antenna eavesdropper. The proposed
method aims to maximize the secrecy rate of the network by jointly optimizing the beamforming vector at
the BS and phase shifts at the IRSs. The resulting optimization problem is non-convex and to solve it we
propose an efficient method based on alternating method and Semi-Definite Relaxation (SDR) technique.
Simulation results show the advantages of using multiple IRSs in the mmWave network in increasing the
secrecy rate. Another result is that as the number of transmitter antennas at the BS or the number of IRSs
increases, the secrecy rate will enhance. Also, we show the behavior of the secrecy rate with the number
of reflecting elements at each IRS.
3Fig. 1. A multi IRS-aided mmWave communication network consisting a single legitimate user and an eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, system and channel model are introduced
and Section III discusses the optimization problem formulation. In Section IV, the proposed algorithm
for solving the optimization problem is proposed and in Section V, we present simulation results. Finally,
Section VI demonstrates the paper conclusions.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
A. System Model
As shown in Fig.1, we consider downlink of a mmWave network where a BS with 푀 antennas serves
a single antenna user in the presence of a single antenna eavesdropper. Suppose that 퐿 IRSs each has 푁
reflecting elements assist in secure communication from the BS to the user. The reflecting elements of
the IRSs change the phase of the received signal and then forward them towards the user. The channel
coefficients from the BS to the 푙th IRS, from the BS to the user, from the BS to the eavesdropper, from
the 푙th IRS to the user, and from the 푙th IRS to the eavesdropper are denoted by F푙 ∈ C푁×푀 , h푑 ∈ C푀×1,
g푑 ∈ C푀×1, h푟푙 ∈ C푁×1, and g푟푙 ∈ C푁×1, respectively. The transmitted signal from the BS is denoted by 푠
that is with zero mean and unit variance. The beamforming vector at the BS is denoted by w that satisfies
| |w| |2 ≤ 푃퐵푆, where 푃퐵푆 is the maximum transmit power of the BS.
The received signal at the legitimate user can be written as
푦푟 =
(
퐿∑
푙=1
h퐻푟푙횯푙F푙 + h퐻푑
)
w푠 + 푛푟 , (1)
4where 푛푟 is additive white Gaussian noise at the user with zero mean and variance 휎
2
푟 .횯푙 = diag{푒 푗휃푙,1 , 푒 푗휃푙,2 , ..., 푒 푗휃푙,푁 } =
diag{훼푙,1, 훼푙,2, ..., 훼푙,푁 } = diag(휶푙) is a diagonal matrix that denotes the effective phase shifts at the IRS
elements and 휃푙,푛 ∈ [0, 2휋) is the phase shift of the 푛th reflecting element of the 푙th IRS. Similar to (1),
the received signal at the eavesdropper is also obtained as
푦푒 =
(
퐿∑
푙=1
g퐻푟푙횯푙F푙 + g퐻푑
)
w푠 + 푛푒 , (2)
where 푛푒 is additive white Gaussian noise at the eavesdropper with zero mean and variance 휎
2
푒 .
The achievable rates of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper are given by
푅푟 = log2(1 +
|
(∑퐿
푙=1 h
퐻
푟푙
횯푙F푙 + h퐻푑
)
w|2
휎2푟
), (3)
푅푒 = log2(1 +
|
(∑퐿
푙=1 g
퐻
푟푙
횯푙F푙 + g퐻푑
)
w|2
휎2푒
), (4)
and the secrecy rate is given by 푅푠 = [푅푟 − 푅푒]+, where [푧]+ =max(푧, 0). Thus, the secrecy rate can be
obtained as
푅푠 = [log2(1 +
|
(∑퐿
푙=1 h
퐻
푟푙
횯푙F푙 + h퐻푑
)
w|2
휎2푟
)
− log2(1 +
|
(∑퐿
푙=1 g
퐻
푟푙
횯푙F푙 + g퐻푑
)
w|2
휎2푒
)]+. (5)
B. Channel Model
The BS-to-user channel h푑 is modeled according to the geometric channel model of the mmWave
communications [12] and can be expressed as
h푑 =
√
푀
퐾
퐾∑
푘=1
휌푢푘,푏퐺푏a푏 (휙푢푘,푏), (6)
where 퐾 is total number of paths, 휌푢
푘,푏
∼ CN(0, 10−0.1푃퐿 (푑)) is the complex gain of the 푘th path between
BS and user, 퐺푏 is the BS antenna gain. a푏 (휙푢푘,푏) is the normalized BS array response vector at an azimuth
angle of departure 휙푢
푘,푏
∈ [0, 2휋]. The path loss can be obtained as [13]
푃퐿(푑) [푑퐵] = 휇 + 10휅 log10(푑) + 휉, (7)
in which 푑, 휇 and 휅 denote the distance between transmitter and receiver, constant path loss term and
path loss exponent, respectively. Also 휉 ∼ 푁 (0, 휎2
휉
) where 휎2
휉
is shadowing variance.
Similar to (6), the BS-to-eavesdropper channel can be modeled by [12]
g푑 =
√
푀
퐾
퐾∑
푘=1
휌푒푘,푏퐺푏a푏 (휙푒푘,푏), (8)
5where 휌푒
푘,푏
∼ CN(0, 10−0.1푃퐿 (푑)) is the complex gain of the 푘th path between BS and eavesdropper.
a푏 (휙푒푘,푏) is the normalized BS array response vector at an azimuth angle of departure 휙푒푘,푏 ∈ [0, 2휋].
With assumption that the BS and IRSs are located at a higher altitude, the channels between them are
assumed to be LoS dominant. Thus the BS-to-푙th IRS channel can be modeled as a rank-one matrix [6],
[14]
F푙 =
√
푀푁휌푙푏퐺푏퐺 푙a푙 (휙푏푙 , 휓푏푙 )a퐻푏 (휙푙푏), 푙 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 퐿}, (9)
where 휌푙
푏
∼ CN(0, 10−0.1푃퐿 (푑)) denotes the complex gain of the BS-to-푙th IRS channel that 푃퐿(푑) is
derived according to (7). 퐺 푙 is the 푙th IRS antenna gain, respectively. 휙
푏
푙
∈ [0, 휋] and 휓푏
푙
∈ [0, 휋]
represent the elevation and azimuth angles of arrival for the 푙th IRS and 휙푙
푏
∈ [0, 2휋] is the azimuth angle
of departure for the BS. a푟 (휙푏푙 , 휓푏푙 ) is the normalized 푙th IRS array response vector, that is denoted by
a푟 (휙푏푙 , 휓푏푙 ) = a푎푧푙 (휓푏푙 ) ⊗ a푒푙푙 (휙푏푙 ), (10)
where a푎푧
푙
(휓푏
푙
) and a푒푙
푙
(휙푏
푙
) are the horizontal and vertical array response vector of the 푙th IRS, respectively.
Also a푏 (휙푙푏) is the normalized BS array response vector.
Similar to (6) and (8), the 푙th IRS-to-user and 푙th IRS-to-eavesdropper channels can be respectively
given by
h푟푙 =
√
푁
퐾
퐾∑
푘=1
휌푢푘,푙퐺 푙a푙 (휙푢푘,푙 , 휓푢푘,푙), (11)
and
g푟푙 =
√
푁
퐾
퐾∑
푘=1
휌푒푘,푙퐺 푙a푙 (휙푒푘,푙 , 휓푒푘,푙), (12)
where 휌푢
푘,푙
∼ CN(0, 10−0.1푃퐿 (푑)) and 휌푒
푘,푙
∼ CN(0, 10−0.1푃퐿 (푑)) are the complex gain of the 푘th path of
푙th IRS-to-user channel and 푙th IRS-to-eavesdropper channel, respectively. 휙푢
푘,푙
∈ [0, 휋] and 휓푢
푘,푙
∈ [0, 휋]
respectively represent the elevation and azimuth angles of departure for the 푙th IRS. Also 휙푒
푘,푙
∈ [0, 휋]
and 휓푒
푘,푙
∈ [0, 휋] represent the elevation and azimuth angle of departure for the 푙th IRS. a푙 (휙푢푘,푙 , 휓푢푘,푙) and
a푙 (휙푒푘,푙 , 휓푒푘,푙) are the normalized array response vectors of the 푙th IRS associated with the IRS-user and
the IRS-eavesdropper paths, respectively. Definition of a푙 (휙푢푘,푙 , 휓푢푘,푙) and a푙 (휙푒푘,푙 , 휓푒푘,푙) are similar to (10)
based on Kronecker product of the 푙th IRS horizontal and vertical array response vectors.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Problem Formulation
As mentioned before, this paper focuses on maximizing the secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the
transmit beamforming vector w at the BS and the phase vector 휶푙 at the IRS, subject to a maximum
6transmission power constraint at the BS and unit modulus constraints on the diagonal elements of 횯푙 .
The secrecy rate optimization problem can be expressed as
푃1 : max
w,휶1,휶2,...,휶퐿
푅푠 (13a)
s.t. | |w| |2 ≤ 푃퐵푆 (13b)
|훼푙,푛 | = 1, 푙 ∈ {1, ..., 퐿}, 푛 ∈ {1, ..., 푁}. (13c)
Problem (푃1) is a non-convex problem because of the coupled variables w and 휶푙 in the objective and
constraint functions.
B. Problem Transformation
By defining h퐻푟 = [h퐻푟1, h퐻푟2, ...,h퐻푟퐿] ∈ C1×퐿푁 , g퐻푟 = [g퐻푟1, g퐻푟2, ..., g퐻푟퐿] ∈ C1×퐿푁 , F = [F1,F2, ...,F퐿]푇 ∈
C
퐿푁×푀 , 횯 = 푑푖푎푔(횯1,횯2, ...,횯퐿) ∈ C퐿푁×퐿푁 and 휶 = [휶1, 휶2, ...,휶퐿]푇 ∈ C퐿푁×1, the optimization
problem (푃1) can be re-wrriten as
푃2 : max
w,휶
log2(1 +
|(h퐻푟 횯F + h퐻푑 )w|2
휎2푟
)
− log2(1 +
|(g퐻푟 횯F + g퐻푑 )w|2
휎2푒
) (14a)
s.t. | |w| |2 ≤ 푃퐵푆 (14b)
|훼푙,푛 | = 1, 푙 ∈ {1, ..., 퐿}, 푛 ∈ {1, ..., 푁}.
The problem (푃2) is also non-convex, since the objective function is a non-concave function with
respect to w and 휶, and also the second constraint is a non-convex equality. Hence, we propose an
algorithm for efficient solving (푃2).
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM AND BEAMFORMING DESIGN
By decomposing the optimization variables into two individual subsets of w and 횯, it is found that
(14b) and (14c) represents two disjoint sets on w and 횯, respectively. Thus, the problem can be solved
alternatively by maximization of w and 횯 in an iterative manner through two disjoint sub-problems. At
each iteration, first for a given values of 횯, a closed-form solution for optimized w is derived. Then, the
second subproblem is solved for a given w using SDR technique. Then this iterative procedure continues
until a convergence.
7A. Sub-Problem 1
First, we assume that the parameter 횯 is fixed and derive the optimal value of w. To this end,
the objective function in problem (P2) is reformulated and then considering that the log function is
monotonically increasing, it is removed. Therefore, the sub-problem 1 can be expressed as
max
w
1 + 1
휎2푟
w퐻 (h퐻푟 횯F + h퐻푑 )퐻 (h퐻푟 횯F + h퐻푑 )w
1 + 1
휎2푒
w퐻 (g퐻푟 횯F + g퐻푑 )퐻 (g퐻푟 횯F + g퐻푑 )w
s.t. w퐻w ≤ 푃퐵푆 . (15)
The optimal value of w is [9]
w푂푃푇 =
√
푃퐵푆 v푚푎푥, (16)
where v푚푎푥 is the unit-norm normalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of a matrix
Z, which is defined as below
Z = [ 1
휎2푟
(h퐻푟 횯F + h퐻푑 )퐻 (h퐻푟 횯F + h퐻푑 ) +
1
푃퐵푆
I푁]
[ 1
휎2푒
(g퐻푟 횯F + g퐻푑 )퐻 (g퐻푟 횯F + g퐻푑 ) +
1
푃퐵푆
I푀]−1, (17)
where I푀 is denotes an 푀 × 푀 identity matrix.
B. Sub-Problem 2
In the next step, for a given w, the problem (푃2) is transformed to sub-problem 2 that can be formulated
as follows [9]
max
휶
(1 + 1
휎2푟
| (h퐻푟 횯F + hℎ푑)w|2)
(1 + 1
휎2푒
| (g퐻푟 횯F + gℎ푑)w|2)
s.t. |훼푙,푛 | = 1, 푙 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 퐿}, 푛 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 푁}. (18)
Then, using the equality c횯 = 휶푇 diag(c) and by defining x = [휶푇 , 1]퐻 , (18) can be reformulated as
max
x
(1 + x퐻H푢푠푒푟x + ℎ푢푠푒푟 )
(1 + x퐻G퐸푣푒x + 푔퐸푣푒)
(19a)
s.t. x퐻S푖x = 1,∀푖, (19b)
where ℎ푢푠푒푟 = h
퐻
푑
ww퐻h푑/휎2푟 , 푔퐸푣푒 = g퐻푑 ww퐻g푑/휎2푒 and
H푢푠푒푟 =
©­«
UU퐻 Uw퐻h푑
h퐻
푑
wU퐻 0
ª®¬ (20a)
G퐸푣푒 =
©­«
VV퐻 Vw퐻g푑
g퐻
푑
wV퐻 0
ª®¬ . (20b)
8In addition, U = diag(h∗푟 )Fw and V = diag(g∗푟 )Fw. Also, S푖 is the matrix that the (푘, 푗)th element of that,
is denoted by
[S푖]푘, 푗 =

1 푖 = 푘 = 푗
0 표푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒.
(21)
The objective function (19a) is a quadratically fractional function and the constranit (19b) is quadratic
equality and non-convex. Therefore, the optimization problem (19) is non-convex and an approximate
solution is presented using SDR technique as follows.
By defining X = xx퐻 , we rewrite (19) into a linear fractional problem as
max
X0
tr(H푢푠푒푟X) + ℎ푢푠푒푟 + 1
tr(G퐸푣푒X) + 푔퐸푣푒 + 1
(22a)
s.t. tr(S푖X) = 1,∀푖 (22b)
Rank(X) = 1. (22c)
The constraint (22c) is non-convex, thus problem (22) can be relaxed by dropping this constrant. Finally,
a rank one approximate of X is presented.
In the following, using the Charnes-Cooper transformation and defining 훾 = 1/(tr(G퐸푣푒X)) + 푔퐸푣푒 + 1
and T = 훾X, (22) is transformed into the following non-fractional problem
max
T0,훾≥0
tr(H푢푠푒푟T) + 훾(ℎ푢푠푒푟 + 1) (23a)
s.t. tr(G퐸푣푒T) + 훾(푔퐸푣푒 + 1) = 1 (23b)
tr(S푖T) = 훾, ∀푖 . (23c)
The problem in (23) is a Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) problem and therefore a convex optimization
problem. After solving (23), X is obtained as T/훾. Then using the fact that X is a square and symmetric
matrix and the assumption that Rank(X) = 푟, it can be represented by
X =
푟∑
푖=1
휆푖v푖v
퐻
푖 , (24)
where 휆푖 and v푖 are the 푖th eigenvalue and eigenvector of X, respectively. The best rank one approximation
of X (the least Euclidean norm) is obtained as
X = 휆푚푎푥v푚푎푥v
퐻
푚푎푥, (25)
where 휆푚푎푥 and v푚푎푥 are the maximum eigenvalue and its corresponding eigenvector, respectively. On the
other hand, X = xx퐻 and therefore x is obtained as follows
x =
√
휆푚푎푥v푚푎푥 . (26)
9V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents the simulation results of our proposed algorithm to indicate the advantages of
using the multiple IRSs in improving the secrecy rate of the mmWave networks. In our simulation, we
assume that the BS with 푀 antennas is located at the center of the polar coordinates. In addition, 퐿
IRSs each with 푁 reflecting elements are installed around the BS at the fixed locations to assist in signal
transmissions. We assume that the IRSs are located on a circle centered at the BS but with different angle.
The 푖th IRS is placed at (30, 푖휋/2(퐿 + 1)) in polar coordinate where 푖 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 퐿}. Also legitimate user
and the eavesdropper are located at (20, 훽) and (15, 훽), respectively, where 훽 ∼ 푈 [0, 휋/2].
Fig. 2 shows the variation of the secrecy rate versus BS’s transmit power for four different numbers
of the IRSs (퐿 = 1, 3, 5, 7), when 푀 = 64 and 푁 = 9. We also show the case that there is no IRS
in the network as a performance benchmark. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that the secrecy rate improves
with the number of IRSs increases. Also for very large numbers of IRSs the performance improvement is
not considerable. The reason is that in that case some IRSs are located very far from the user and their
contribution is very low.
Fig. 3 illustrates the effect of the number of antennas at the BS on the network secrecy rate for different
numbers of IRSs and also for the case of no IRS as a benchmark. It can be observed that the secrecy rate
improves with the number of antennas. By comparison of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 we can say that the increase
in the number of antennas from 24 to 64 is almost equivalent to increasing the transmission power by a
factor three.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the secrecy rate versus the number of reflecting elements at the IRSs. As it is
expected, because of more degrees of freedom in controlling signals phases by adding more reflecting
elements, the secrecy rate for all the cases is improved.
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy rate performance versus the number of IRSs in the network. In this figure, we
consider two different scenarios corresponding to different locations of the user and eavesdropper relative
to the BS and IRSs. In the first scenario, the user and eavesdropper (at locations (8, 휋/4) and (4, 휋/4),
respectively) are more close to the BS than the IRSs. In the second scenario, the user and eavesdropper
( at locations (26, 휋/4) and (22, 휋/4), respectively) located close to the IRS and far from the BS. These
scenarios are respectively labeled by ’Scenario 1’, ’Scenario 2’. As shown in Fig. 5, increasing the number
of IRSs always improve secrecy performance. However, if the IRSs are placed in closer positions to the
user, the secrecy rate improvement with the number of IRSs will be more significant.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated a multi-IRS-assisted mmWave network, where the BS’s beamforming
vector and the IRSs refelcting elements were jointly optimized to maximize the secrecy rate of the system.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus the BS’s transmission power (푃퐵푆) for different number of IRSs (with M=64, N=9).
We solved the resulting optimization problem using alternating technique and SDR method. Simulation
results demonstrated that adding more IRSs in the network or increasing the number of reflecting elements
at the IRSs enhances the performance.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus the number of reflecting elements at the IRSs for different number of IRSs.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus the numbers of IRSs for different user and eavesdropper placements.
